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CONTEMPLATING CLAIMS TRADINGS AT THE MARGINS
ABSTRACT
The buying and selling of claims has become a ubiquitous component of
many large chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. At its worst, such “claims trading”
inhibits the debtor’s ability to achieve a “fresh start” and the creditors’ ability
to obtain a fair distribution of bankruptcy assets, as envisioned by the
Bankruptcy Code. At its best, the practice relieves tension and stimulates the
bankruptcy process by affording hostile creditors the opportunity to exit early
from the bankruptcy case with the transfer of their claims to other, more eager
participants.
The current scholarship on claims trading ordinarily limits its focus to the
period after the debtor’s filing of a petition for relief but before plan
confirmation, which is when the greatest frequency of trading occurs. Alas, other
activities that are essential to the resolution of the bankruptcy case also take
place during this period. The overlap has consequently prompted most scholars
to denounce claims trading as a disruptor in the bankruptcy process.
What the research above fails to recognize is that confining the analysis on
claims trading to the single greatest-frequency period leads to incomplete
theories. In reality, claims trading takes place outside of this period as well; it
is not so temporally bounded, as suggested.
When reexamined outside of the mainstream’s contexts (i.e., prior to the
petition date or after plan confirmation), claims trading can offer significant
benefits. Trading at these periods fosters healthier bargaining between the
debtor and its creditors, and enhances the likelihood of a swift procedure. Thus,
bankruptcy constituents should contemplate and, moreover, endorse claims
trading at either the pre-petition or post-plan confirmation phases so as to ease
concerns about a trade’s disruptive capacity inside a bankruptcy case.
INTRODUCTION
Claims trading, the buying and selling of a claim (i.e., a right to payment),
is often associated with a bankruptcy proceeding. Such buying and selling of
claims is not a novel phenomenon, but rather an ancient custom “as old as the
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Republic.”1 Over the years, this custom has ballooned into a multibillion-dollar
industry,2 hinting at claims trading’s importance in the bankrutpcy context.3

The claims trading “industry,” however, is not without its faults. In
bankruptcy, “[c]laims trading has the tendency to destroy the traditional
‘community’ that a [c]hapter 11 filing is meant to facilitate.”4 Bankruptcy
participants have thus come to expect a certain degree of disruption
whenever a claims trade occurs.5 Many courts have attempted to institute
mechanisms to limit the degree of disruption, but such tactics often further
exacerbate and delay the bankruptcy process. This Comment presents an
alternate pathway to resolve the issue, one that focuses on how the timing of
a trade can both emphasize the benefits of a claims trade and minimize its
disruptive costs.
A. The Bankruptcy Process, Generally
To understand how claims trading causes disruptive interference, one must
first understand the bankruptcy process, generally. In an attempt to discharge its
debts, a distressed corporation may file for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code).6 When a debtor corporation files for chapter 11
relief, the debtor’s creditors in turn often file a proof of claim against the
corporation’s estate for any outstanding debts owed to them.7 A claim is “a right
to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or [a] right to an equitable remedy.”8
This claim is what entitles a debtor’s creditors to participate in the various stages
of the chapter 11 bankruptcy process.9
A critical phase of the chapter 11 bankruptcy process is the plan approval.10
To effectively discharge its debts, the debtor corporation must first set forth a
1
Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in
Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 26 (1990).
2
COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., DISCLOSURE AND USE OF
POSTCONFIRMATION ENTITIES AND CLAIMS TRADING (2012–2014).
3
See id.
4
Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 272 (2005).
5
See id.
6
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012).
7
See id. § 501(a).
8
Id. § 101(5).
9
See id. § 101(10)(A).
10
See id. § 1126.
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plan that addresses all allowed claims of its creditors.11 The Code dictates that
creditors are to be segregated into distinct classes based on the type of claim—
most commonly into “substantially similar” classes of claims or into an
“administrative convenience” class.12 Each class of creditors then votes to either
accept or reject the debtor’s plan, with acceptance of the plan requiring both a
super majority (in the amount) as well as a simple majority (in the number) of
accepting claims.13
Widespread acceptance largely revolves around whether the debtor
satisfactorily performs certain obligations or agrees to repay a suitable sum of
money as part of the plan.14 Even when a class of creditors does not agree with
the proposed plan, the debtor may attempt to “cramdown” against that class.15
To cramdown against a class of creditors, the plan cannot “discriminate unfairly,
and [must be] fair and equitable[] with respect to each class of claims . . . that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”16
Assuming the plan meets all requisite conditions and all classes of creditors
consensually accept the plan or the debtor crams down against them,17 the
bankruptcy court will confirm the plan.18 “[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan
bind the debtor,” meaning the debtor must meet all performance obligations and
complete all planned repayments under the chapter 11 plan.19 Importantly,
though, “the confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt that
arose before the date of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified.”20
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP) authorize the transfer
of a claim at any point throughout the processes mentioned above.21 The transfer
of a claim entails the buying and selling of a creditor’s claims against a debtor
corporation in bankruptcy.22 The majority of these trades occur after the petition

11

See id. §§ 1126, 1129.
Id. § 1122(a)–(b).
13
Id. § 1126(c).
14
See id. § 1129.
15
See id. § 1129(b)(1).
16
Id.
17
See id. § 1129(a).
18
See id. § 1129(b)(1).
19
Id. § 1141(a).
20
Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
21
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e).
22
Jeffrey N. Rich & Eric T. Moser, Bankruptcy Claims Trading: Basic Concepts 1 (2013), available at
http://www.r3mlaw.com/Articles/Bankruptcy-Claims-Trading-Basic-Concepts.pdf.
12
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date for bankruptcy relief but before plan confirmation.23 Rather than waiting
out the results of the bankruptcy process and bearing the associated risk, a
creditor with an allowed claim may opt to sell that claim, usually to a distressed
debt investor.24 The distressed debt investor typically purchases the claim at a
discount on the assumption that the claim will later yield a higher rate of return.25
B.

Question Presented

The associated costs and benefits of claims trading are hotly debated.26
Supporters argue that distressed debt investors “provide a service to the
creditors, often vendors and suppliers, by giving them a quick and certain payout
in an inherently uncertain situation.”27 Conversely, cynics contend that the lack
of transparency and oversight in this secondary trading market leads to problems
for all parties involved (e.g., litigation that “both delays the resolution and
increases the cost of the case.”).28 Regardless of this disagreement between the
costs and benefits associated with claims trading, proponents of both viewpoints

23
See Aaron L. Hammer & Michael A. Brandess, Claims Trading: The Wild West of Chapter 11s, 29
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (July/August 2010) (“Instead of waiting for confirmation of the reorganization plan to
determine the value of the claim and authorize its payment . . . the creditor may choose to sell its claim to a third
party.”); see also Seth Brumby & Nicoletta Kotsianas, Lehman Brothers Special Financing’s Derivative Claims
Secondary Market Grows After Proof-of-Claims Revision, SECONDMARKET (July 8, 2009),
https://www.secondmarket.com/education/news/press/lehman-brothers-special-financing%E2%80%99s-derivativeclaims-secondary-market-grows-after-proof-of-claims-revision (discussing that as the bar date on the filing on
a proof-of-claim approaches, claim trading volume should pick up); AMR Update: Claims Trading
Opportunities, SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.sidley.com/amr-update-claims-tradingopportunities-08-08-2012 (“Typically, bankruptcy claims trading increases as the proceedings get closer to a
plan of reorganization.”).
24
See Hammer, supra note 23.
25
Rich, supra note 22, at 2.
26
Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering The Virtues of Negotiability in The Wake of Enron,
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 89 (2007).
27
The Role of Claims Trading in Bankruptcy, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:37 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2016/02/16/the-role-of-claims-trading-in-bankruptcy.
28
Michelle M. Harner et al., Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty, HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL BANKR. ROUND TABLE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2014/
04/29/activist-investors-distressed-companies-and-value-uncertainty/; see The Role of Claims Trading, supra
note 27.
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note that the practice conclusively disrupts the bankruptcy process.29 So the
question remains: does “claims trading help or hinder?”30
C.

Brief Response

Because most claims trading occurs after the petition for relief but before
plan confirmation, the predominant trend has been to focus on the impact of
claims trading as between the post-petition and pre-plan confirmation phases of
bankruptcy (hereinafter referred to as “T1”).31 Accordingly, while some
literature discusses how claims trading encourages flexibility and liquidity to an
otherwise inflexible and illiquid circumstance,32 most literature stresses how
claims trading during T1 precipitates informational asymmetry, which, in turn,
allows a select few creditors to gain an excessive degree of influence over the
bankruptcy case.33 Remarkably, though, “no one seems to have called for an
outright ban on claims trading.”34
This Comment cogitates on the fact that claims trading may also occur at the
pre-petition phase (hereinafter referred to as “T0”) or the post-plan confirmation
phase (hereinafter referred to as “T2”) of a chapter 11 case.

29
Compare American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, Introduction, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 4,
12 (Winter 2015) (“[C]laims trading and derivative products have changed the composition of creditor classes.
Although these developments are not unwelcome or unhealthy, the Bankruptcy Code was not originally designed
to rehabilitate companies efficaciously in this complex environment.”), with Frederick Tung, Confirmation and
Claims Trading, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1684, 1686 (1996) (“Unfortunately, claims trading has the potential to
impede reorganization, imposing costs on the debtor company and its creditors. Because of [c]hapter 11’s
collective nature and the significant role of creditors in the process, instability in the creditor constituency may
be disruptive.”).
30
The Role of Claims Trading, supra note 27.
31
See Hammer, supra note 23; see also Brumby, supra note 23 (discussing that as the bar date on the
filing on a proof-of-claim approaches, claim trading volume should pick up); AMR Update, supra note 23
(“Typically, bankruptcy claims trading increases as the proceedings get closer to a plan of reorganization.”).
32
Priya Ghodasara, Note, Is Claims Trading a Risk or an Art?: The Evolution of the Claims Trading
Market Since KB Toys and Enron, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 497, 503 (2016).
33
Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at The Gate?, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 155, 195–96 (2011).
34
Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 67, 76 (2009).
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Figure 1: Prevalence of Claims Trading Literature at Phases T0, T1,
and T2.
Simply put, claims trading’s reach begins before bankruptcy and extends
beyond it. Thus, bankruptcy participants (i.e., courts, creditors, and debtors)
ought to contemplate and likewise endorse claims trading toward the margins of
the bankruptcy spectrum at T0 and T2. Doing so can minimize the degree of
disruption that claims trading sometimes produces in chapter 11 bankruptcy,
which in turn may help bankruptcy courts satisfy the Code’s objectives of: (1)
offering the debtor a “fresh start” for the future; and (2) distributing the debtor’s
assets and income for the benefit of all similarly situated creditors.35
D.

Structure

Part I provides for a background on claims trading, with a discussion of the
history, market, and potential benefits and drawbacks associated with the buying
and selling of claims. Part II posits the possibility for claims trading to occur at
the margins. Associated with this section is an in-depth analysis of the benefits
related to restricting the practice to the T0 and T2 timeframe. Part III gestures
toward how the law might reach the above-mentioned desirable ends. The few
35
Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (“It is the purpose of the
Bankrupt Act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors and then to relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”).
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suggestions discussed within this portion are meant to be tentative and
illustrative rather than fully investigated. Part IV concludes by reinforcing the
purpose of this Comment, which in its simplest form is to showcase how limiting
claims trading during T1 while promoting its use at the margins reinforces a
balanced and fair bankruptcy outcome.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Brief History of Claims Trading
As previously mentioned, claims trading is not a new phenomenon but rather
an old habit that dates back to the late 1700s.36 Congress first attempted to
regulate claims trading with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act).37 In effect,
the Act “codified a court’s equitable right to ‘limit any claim or stock acquired
by such person or committee in contemplation or in the course of the proceeding
under this chapter.’”38 Other regulatory bodies buttressed this regulation on
claims trading with the issuance of similar guidelines on securities trading.39
Combined, these systems sought to protect the trading public by restricting a
trade’s occurrence to only those situations that incorporated appropriate amounts
of governmental supervision.40
In 1978, however, disagreements between the House and the Senate on how
to treat claims trading caused Congress to enact the modern Bankruptcy Code
without a single instruction on claims trading.41 In effect, this decision
deregulated the market by rendering pertinent claims trading restrictions found
in chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 obsolete.42 Although Congress
36
See Hammer, supra note 23 (“At that time, the original 13 colonies were insolvent, yet owed
tremendous debts to soldiers, farmers and merchants for their respective roles in the Revolutionary War. Early
American investors purchased these debts for approximately one quarter of their par value, hoping that the new
American government would assume full liability.”); see also In re Pleasant Hill Partners, L.P., 163 B.R. 388,
390–91 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (discussing how many of the issues surrounding claims trading predate the
modern Code).
37
Hammer, supra note 23.
38
Id. (internal citations omitted).
39
In re Pleasant Hill Partners, L.P., 163 B.R. at 390.
40
Id.; see Fortgang, supra note 1, at 10–11 (“[C]hapter X explicitly punished trading by fiduciaries (such
as members of protective committees) and explicitly regulated the voting of claims and interests that had been
acquired during the case.”); see also The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 212, 249.
41
See Hammer, supra note 23, at 2 (“In the years leading up to the creation of the modern Bankruptcy
Code in 1978, the decision regarding how to reflect the substance of §§ 212 and 249 was considered by both
Congress and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. However, when Congress later ‘reconciled the
House and Senate bill into the final bill which became the Bankruptcy Code, Congress dropped’ the sections
pertaining to the regulation of claims trading.”).
42
Id.
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intended for the Code to operate this way, the newly deregulated market for
claims trading caused widespread concern.43 Congress addressed this concern in
1983 with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
(FRBP).44 Under it, Rule 3001(e) required that parties transferring claims must
“inform the court . . . [and] disclose the consideration paid for the transferred
claims.”45 This procedure allowed courts to challenge trades based on whether
sellers had access to adequate information that would “enable them to make an
informed decision on the sale of their claim[s].”46
Over the years, this judicial oversight brought about a chill in the markets,
“as [it] was perceived to impair the liquidity of claims.”47 Congress responded
by amending the FRBP in 1991 to greatly limit the degree of judicial
involvement with regard to claims trading.48 Now under amended Rule 3001(e),
courts can still intervene, but only if the transferor or the transferee objects to
the trade.49 Without any objection, the courts must enter the order recognizing
the transfer of the claim.50 In short, current rules and regulations broaden the
right to trade on a claim.
B. The Current Market
According to economist Henry Dunning MacLeod, “[i]f we were asked—
[w]ho made the discovery which has most deeply affected the fortunes of the
human race? We think, after full consideration, we might safely answer—The
man who first discovered that a [d]ebt is a [s]aleable [c]ommodity.”51 As of
2012, the market for claims trading had reached an extraordinary $41 billion.52
The volume of claims bought and sold in the bankruptcy markets continues to
climb to unprecedented heights, making claims trading a common occurrence in
nearly all chapter 11 bankruptcies.53

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 659 (2010); see
Hammer, supra note 23, at 2.
48
Hammer, supra note 23, at 2.
49
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e).
50
Id.
51
Anders J. Maxwell, The Examiners: Claims Trading Puts Integrity of Chapter 11 at Risk, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb 17, 2016, 12:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2016/02/17/the-examinersclaims-trading-puts-integrity-of-chapter-11-at-risk/.
52
COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 2.
53
Maxwell, supra note 51.
44
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C. The Impact of Claims Trading on the Bankruptcy Case
Any action that influences the “collective and consensual nature of the
chapter 11 process” has the power to sway the outcome of the bankruptcy case.54
Since “[c]laims trading has the tendency to destroy the traditional ‘community’
that a chapter 11 filing is meant to facilitate,” bankruptcy participants can expect
disruption—both positive and negative—to occur at some point over the course
of any chapter 11 petition.55
1. The Positives
Claims trading confers many benefits for both the debtor corporation and its
creditors. Importantly, claims trading “provides liquidity to an otherwise illiquid
market.”56 Without claims trading, creditors must await plan confirmation
before (possible) repayment on their claims.57 Because stereotypical creditors,
such as vendors or customary lenders (i.e., banks), extend credit to a company
on the assumption that the credit will be paid back with interest, they never
anticipate having to build “their business model . . . around tying up capital in
bankruptcy proceedings.” 58 Accordingly, when a debtor corporation files for
bankruptcy, most creditors are unprepared or unwilling to handle the bankruptcy
process.59
Fortunately—yet somewhat controversially—there are willing investors
looking to enter the bankruptcy market at the exact moment in time when
creditors are seeking an early exit.60 A distressed-debt investor may relieve a
creditor of its stake in the bankruptcy proceeding by purchasing an original
creditor’s claim.61
As a result, the notion of “the prototypical general creditor has changed. It
is no longer a small player holding a claim much like everyone else’s.”62 Instead,
it is a large broker-dealer, private equity firm, or hedge fund.63 These institutions
find the bankruptcy market alluring because it provides “opportunities that the
54

Tung, supra note 29, at 1715.
Goldschmid, supra note 4.
56
Ghodasara, supra note 32.
57
Baird, supra note 47, at 660.
58
Id.
59
Id. (“holders of some claims . . . never expected to be long-term investors . . . [and] are not set up to
participate in the Chapter 11 proceeding.”).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 653.
63
Id. at 652.
55
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highly regulated [public] market . . . d[oes] not.”64 In return for their investment,
most investors seek either to gain a profit or acquire strategic control over the
entire business post-bankruptcy.65
Regardless of these investors’ motivations, their arrival often adds value and
much-needed optimism to the bankruptcy case.66 For instance, in filing a
bankruptcy petition the debtor often strains its rapport with its prior partners (and
now presumed creditors).67 A distressed-debt investor can relieve mounting
tension and thereby free the debtor from an irate creditor.68 Moreover, these
investors may stand as the only source of rescue financing available to the debtor
in the face of grave odds of survival.69 They likely “have a good sense of the
entire value of the enterprise [as compared to] a trade creditor or small
bondholder . . . [and thus] may be able to find overlooked value.”70 In fact, such
was the case in both Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and Kmart’s restructuring
during the economic crisis of 2008, when distressed-debt investors swooped in
to interject in the bankruptcy process.71
Investors further provide institutional know-how that others in the
bankruptcy proceeding may desperately need in navigating repayment protocols
and restructuring processes.72 Accordingly, many scholars describe distresseddebt investing “as a phoenix. Rising from the ashes of bankruptcy are revitalized
firms, thanks to the determination of investors who immolate short-run
destructive behaviors in favor of long-run value maximization.”73

64

Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
66
Id. (“Claims trading flourishes because it is attractive to buyers as well as sellers.”).
67
Thomas Donegan, Comment, Covering the “Security Blanket”: Regulating Bankruptcy Claims and
Claim-Participations Trading under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 387 (1998).
68
Id.
69
Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study Of Investors’ Objectives,
16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 71 (2008).
70
Baird, supra note 47, at 661.
71
See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications Of Activist
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 725–27 (2008) (discussing Kmart’s restructuring and
hedge fund ESL’s involvement as a distressed-debt investor); Ghodasara, supra note 32, at 522–23 (discussing
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy).
72
Baird, supra note 47, at 660.
73
Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 274.
65

FOLKERTH_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

CLAIMS TRADINGS AT THE MARGINS

6/14/2018 3:48 PM

733

2. The Negatives
Claims trading likewise causes many problems—tantamount among them
being a lack of transparency.74 According to Arthur Levitt, prior Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), “transparency promotes the
fairness and efficiency of the U.S. capital markets . . . . This is as true for debt
markets as for equity markets.”75 In bankruptcy, transparency stems from
disclosure. In fact, “[i]t has been said that the ‘three most important words in
bankruptcy are: disclose, disclose, disclose.’”76 The SEC and other agencies,
however, afford some claims traders (e.g., hedge funds) significant regulatory
leeway to keep information secret that may be otherwise useful to third parties.77
Secrecy remains the central focus for these traders; they “do not want the public
knowing ‘who their investors are, what they invest in, what they pay for their
investments, or, more importantly, what their return is on their investments.’”78
Naturally, then, claims trading brings disruption to the bankruptcy process by
inhibiting transparency.79
Courts tolerate secrecy out of fear that forced disclosure may negatively
impact liquidity within the bankruptcy framework.80 Because hedge funds desire
to conceal their proprietary investing knowledge, requiring disclosure may cause
them to pull away from the claims trading market.81 Yet, “[t]ransparency is the
very essence of bankruptcy proceedings, and by not holding hedge funds to this
standard, the scales are tipped in their favor.”82 So whereas a debtor in

74
See generally Sparkle L. Alexander, Note, The Rule 2019 Battle: When Hedge Funds Collide with The
Bankruptcy Code, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1411 (2008).
75
The Bond Price Competition Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Finance & Hazardous Materials, 106th Cong. 9–11 (1999) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Comm’n).
76
Alexander, supra note 74, at 1416.
77
Cf. id. at 1416–17 (indicating that traditional creditors must file a verified statement “containing the
following information: (1) the name and address of each creditor . . . ; (2) the nature and amount of the claim . . .
and the time of acquisition if it was acquired within a year of the filing of the petition; (3) the facts and
circumstances in connection with the employment of the representative filing the statement, and, for committees,
the names of the entities who employed or organized the committees; and (4) the amounts of claims . . . , the
times they were acquired, the prices paid, and any subsequent sales of the claims or interests.”).
78
See id. at 1414.
79
Id. at 1453–54.
80
See id. at 1438 (“Disclosure . . . threatens this liquidity because the majority of distressed investors are
hedge funds that rely on secrecy for their success.”).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1440.
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bankruptcy has significant disclosure requirements,83 a distressed debt investor
does not.84
Outside of bankruptcy, the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934
bar such secrecy by demanding “continuous disclosure.”85 Under this regulatory
regime, a reporting company must deliver to the public “an extensive description
of the company’s business, audited financial statements for the fiscal year, and
management’s discussion and analysis of the position and performance of the
company.”86 Inside of bankruptcy, no such rules demand an equivalent degree
of transparency on the trading of claims.87 This void provides distressed-debt
investors a strategic advantage over other participants, wherein these investors
quietly accumulate large amounts of a debtor’s debt through claims trading and
in turn then heavily influence the terms of the debtor’s subsequent sale or
restructuring.88 However, “[t]he company or other stakeholders could make
different or more timely, proactive decisions regarding a financial restructuring
if afforded more complete information.”89 The informational asymmetry clouds
other bankruptcy participants’ judgments, spawning uncertainty, added expense,
and even conflict in the bankruptcy case.90
Besides the issue of disclosure, claims trading also upsets the central
framework of the Code, which works to balance a “fresh start” for the debtor
with fair distribution of assets to similarly situated creditors.91 Distressed-debt
investors, by definition, are meant to invest and then extract value—either
monetary or organizational—from the debtor.92 While some hedge funds pursue
83

See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
Harner, supra note 33, at 201–02; see Alexander, supra note 74, at 1420 (discussing how hedge funds,
as the predominant trafficker of claims, routinely form “ad hoc” or unofficial committees that evade disclosure
requirements.); see also FED. R. BANK. P. 2019(c) advisory committee’s notes to 2011 amendment (noting that
a recent 2011 amendment caused for a discontinuation of the disclosure requirement on the amount paid for the
claim and any subsequent sales of that claims.).
85
COX, HILLMAN, LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 9–10 (7th ed. 2013).
The Securities Act has a goal of protecting investors in primary distributions of securities, while the Exchange
Act focuses on the secondary trading markets and its participants. The three types of companies required to
register are companies that: (1) have securities listed on a national exchange; (2) have $10 million or more in
assets and have securities held by at least 2,000 investors; or (3) have filed a registration statement.
86
Id. at 10.
87
Harner, supra note 33, at 195.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 195–96.
90
Id. at 196.
91
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. at 554–55 (“It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert
the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.”).
92
Harner, supra note 69, at 107.
84
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long-term investment strategies, “[t]oday’s private investors . . . feel far greater
pressure to cash out sooner, even if this destroys long-term value. To that end,
they may acquire control (through claims trading) . . . and use that control to
strip—and then flip—assets, rendering an otherwise viable firm incapable of
reorganizing.”93 Alternatively, a distressed-debt investor may seek not mere
profits but control over the entire debtor corporation. Such investors are
commonly termed corporate raiders or vulture investors; they “target
undervalued, cash-flush or mismanaged companies” and pursue a loan-to-own
strategy, whereby the creditor purchases a large debt and subsequently converts
the debt into an equity stake in the distressed company.94 With an equity stake
comes ownership, whereby the investor gains the right to control the company’s
actions both post-plan confirmation and later upon discharge of all debts.95 In
these two aforementioned ways, the distressed-debt investor limits the debtor
company’s prospects for a “fresh start.”
The complex strategies often employed by distressed-debt investors in
claims trading may likewise destroy value for other creditors.96 For instance,
hedge funds have been known to literally hedge risk by acquiring various types
of interests or debts in the same company.97 In bankruptcy, these varied tranches
of debt or equity ownership afford the distressed-debt investor the opportunity
to “block an out-of-court restructuring . . . [or] reorganization plan, neither of
which can occur without the support of a certain number and amount of claims
and interests. This leverage might, in turn, enable the investor to extract rents
from other[s] . . . committed to supporting the plan.”98 A distressed-debt investor
might also resell its recently-acquired claim and thus force the remaining
creditors to re-analyze a proposed chapter 11 plan or re-visit voting preferences
in the confirmation of that plan.99 The distressed-debt investor thereby inhibits
the repayment or restructuring process in the bankruptcy case.
Claims trading therefore not only “significantly increases existing
information asymmetry in restructuring negotiations[,]” but also diminishes the
likelihood of a successful “fresh start” for the debtor and a fair distribution of
assets to creditors.100 Thus, the claims trading process, especially when enacted

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1609, 1618 (2009).
Harner, supra note 33, at 158, 165.
Id.
Lipson, supra note 93, at 1616.
Id. at 1616–17.
Id. at 1617.
See Donegan, supra note 67.
Harner, supra note 33, at 195.

FOLKERTH_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

736

6/14/2018 3:48 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

during the T1 phase, tends to disrupt the overall flow of the chapter 11
proceeding from start-to-finish.
D. The Struggle to End the Disruption
Amidst the disruption are the courts, “struggling to bring the law and markets
in sync.”101 Because the Code and FRBP do not heavily regulate the transfer of
a claim, and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have offered effective
guidance on this challenging issue, lower bankruptcy courts are forced to resolve
instances of claims trading in a disjointed fashion:102 “Bankruptcy courts
presiding over cases in which claims were traded have confronted a host of
issues including: imposing disclosure obligations; preventing conflicts of
interest on creditors’ committees and bad faith voting on reorganization plans;
and preserving the beneficial tax consequences of net operating losses.”103 To
bring the law and markets back in alignment, bankruptcy courts (and other
bankruptcy participants) must advocate for a system that limits the degree of
disruption associated with claims trading while allowing for its merits to shine.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Possibility of Claims Trading at the Margins
Exactly when claims trading occurs oftentimes defines the degree of
disruption felt by the courts and other bankruptcy participants. Most trades occur
after the filing of a petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 but before the
confirmation of the reorganization or repayment plan (previously referred to as
“T1”).104 Trading at this point in time has historically proven to be highly
disruptive. Yet claims trading can (and does) likewise occur at points earlier and
later along the bankruptcy spectrum, with the outer margins being: (1) before

101

Levitin, supra note 26 (emphasis added).
Tally M. Wiener & Nicholas B. Malito, On the Nature of the Transferred Bankruptcy Claim, 12 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 35, 42 (2009).
103
Id.
104
Hammer, supra note 23 (“Instead of waiting for confirmation of the reorganization plan to determine
the value of the claim and authorize its payment . . . the creditor may choose to sell its claim to a third party.”);
see also Brumby, supra note 23 (discussing that as the bar date on the filing on a proof-of-claim approaches,
claim trading volume should pick up); AMR Update, supra note 23 (“Typically, bankruptcy claims trading
increases as the proceedings get closer to a plan of reorganization.”).
102
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the filing of the petition (previously referred to as “T0”); and (2) after
confirmation of the reorganization plan (previously referred to as “T2”).

Figure 2: Bankruptcy Timeline
Besides providing an “easy exit from a reorganization proceeding for those who
are ill equipped to navigate it,” trading at these extremes fosters a more
collaborative environment for bankruptcy participants to fashion a suitable
outcome.105
In review, acknowledging that claims trading can occur at T0 and T2 is a
critical first step to comprehending its benefits.
The Code and FRBP not only guide parties’ actions in a bankruptcy
proceeding, but further contemplate when such actions are to occur.106 Put
differently, the Code and FRBP know how to account for the timing of an action
in bankruptcy. For instance, § 1125 of the Code indicates that a debtor
corporation cannot solicit plan acceptance or rejection until after it discloses
adequate information and transmits its plan for reorganization to the holder of a
claim.107 Similarly, § 1129 of the Code requires, among other things, that
confirmation of a plan is to take place only if the plan first complies with
applicable provisions of the title, and each class of similarly situated claims
holders has voted and by majority vote accepted the plan.108 To trade on a claim,
though, § 501 of the Code and Rule 3001 (when read together) only demand that
a creditor timely file a proof of claim by written statement.109 Neither regulation
expressly limits when the transfer of a claim can occur even though it is
discussed generally.110

105
106
107
108
109
110

Baird, supra note 47, at 660.
See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)–(c), 1125, 1129 (2012); FED. R. BANK. P. 3001(a), (e).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (discussing post-petition disclosure and solicitation).
See id. § 1129 (discussing confirmation of a plan).
See id. §§ 501(b), (c); FED. R. BANK. P. 3001(a), (e).
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); FED. R. BANK. P. 3001.
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Broadly-speaking, then, the transfer of a claim is not limited temporally.111
The fact that bankruptcy courts retain the ability to preside over other actions,
which incorporate claims trading before or after T1, reinforces this assertion.112
For example, § 1126(b) of the Code grants the option for claims trading to take
place at T0 as part of a “pre-packaged” plan.113 Under this provision:
a holder of a claim or interest that has accepted or rejected the plan
before the commencement of the case . . . is deemed to have accepted
or rejected such plan, as the case may be, if — (1) the solicitation of
such acceptance or rejection was in compliance with any applicable
nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation governing the adequacy of
disclosure in connection with such solicitation; or (2) if there is not
any such law, rule, or regulation, such acceptance or rejection was
solicited after disclosure to such holder of adequate information. . . .114

Simply put, a soon-to-be debtor can solicit votes in support of a reorganization
or repayment plan “from the appropriate creditor groups prior to the filing of the
petition.”115 Given the Code’s acknowledgement of and the court’s acceptance
of such a pre-petition action by the debtor and its creditor groups, claims trading
at T0 is a true possibility.
Similarly, because “the Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction to interpret,
enforce, or aid the operation of a plan of reorganization” after plan confirmation,
claims trading at T2 is also a possibility.116 The advisory committee notes of the
1991 amendment to Rule 3022,117 as well as other provisions of the Code under
chapter 11, reiterate how bankruptcy courts indeed retain jurisdiction over and
may take further actions in the bankruptcy proceeding even post-plan
confirmation.118 In short, “[t]he continuing force of these provisions contradicts
the generalization that the post-confirmation phase is entirely ‘after

111

See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)–(c), 1125, 1129 (2012); FED. R. BANK. P. 3001(a), (e).
See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2012).
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
JAMES M. LAWNICZAK, TREATISE ON 2-16 ASSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
§ 16.19(3)(h) (2015).
116
Lacy v. Stinky Love, Inc. (In re Lacy), 304 B.R. 439, 444 (D. Colo. 2004).
117
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022 (“A final decree closing the case after the estate is fully administered does
not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce or interpret its own orders and does not prevent the court from
reopening the case for cause pursuant to § 350(b) of the Code.”).
118
See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012) (authorizing post-confirmation dismissal or conversion); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1127(b) (2012) (authorizing modification of a confirmed plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (2012) (authorizing
revocation of a confirmed plan on the basis of fraud); 11 U.S.C. § 1142 (2012) (authorizing enforcement of any
acts necessary to effect consummation of the plan).
112
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bankruptcy.’”119 Therefore, the T2 timeframe operates as a strong option for
when claims trading might yet still occur.
The T1 timeframe, nevertheless, dominates the bankruptcy timeline with
regard to when the greatest number of claims trades tends to occur.120 Although
there is no definitive reason for why T1 presents itself with the greatest volume
of claims trading activity, the predominant hypothesis reflects the belief that any
creditor would rather avoid the associated risks, costs, and delays inherent in a
bankruptcy proceeding than endure them.121 As previously stated, creditors
never anticipate having to build “their business model . . . around tying up capital
in bankruptcy proceedings.” 122 And even in instances where the creditor is a
sophisticated bank or institutional lender, the preference is to sell off the “risky
securities that tend to decrease the value of their investment portfolios.”123 Thus,
once a debtor files for bankruptcy, creditors often pursue strategies, such as
claims trading, to relinquish their stake in the case as soon as possible.124
A related justification for the increased frequency of claims trading at T1 is
that at the same time when creditors are looking to exit, distressed-debt investors
are looking to enter. Investors pursue a claim, especially at T1, because
temporally this is when the highest stakes occur within the bankruptcy
process.125 Critical negotiations and voting takes place then, which allows the
owner of a claim to heavily influence the bankruptcy outcome.126 Investors
looking to ensure a return on their own investment rightly conclude then that
influencing the plan proposal and voting process provides for the greatest
opportunity through which to manage other creditors’ rights and guide the
debtor’s restructuring or repayment schedule.127
119
Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying The Authority of Litigation Trusts: Why Post-Confirmation Trustees
Cannot Assert Creditors’ Claims Against Third Parties, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012).
120
Hammer, supra note 23 (“Instead of waiting for confirmation of the reorganization plan to determine
the value of the claim and authorize its payment . . . the creditor may choose to sell its claim to a third party.”);
see also Brumby, supra note 23 (discussing that as the bar date on the filing on a proof-of-claim approaches,
claim trading volume should pick up); AMR Update, supra note 23 (“Typically, bankruptcy claims trading
increases as the proceedings get closer to a plan of reorganization.”).
121
Levitin, supra note 34, at 73.
122
Baird, supra note 47, at 660.
123
Alexander, supra note 74, at 1415.
124
See Levitin, supra note 26, at 87 (“Creditors can wait for years to receive a payout in a large Chapter
11 case and the expected payout at the end is highly speculative. The ability to sell bankruptcy claims provides
an exit opportunity for creditors who do not wish to incur the hassle and expense of the reorganization process.”).
125
See generally Alexander, supra note 74.
126
Id. at 1415.
127
See Levitin, supra note 34, at 73 (discussing how investors have historically focused on purchasing
claims after the debtor proposed a plan but before creditors voted, yet acknowledging that investors are pursuing
purchasing claims earlier in the process).
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The frequency of claims trading during these pivotal moments in bankruptcy
cases continues to rise.128 A recent empirical study underscores this conclusion,
noting that “the overwhelming majority of the distressed debt respondents intend
to maintain or increase their investments in the distressed debt market . . . .”129
Unfortunately, with increased claims trading activity comes more intense
competition between the creditor and other bankruptcy participants for control
in the proceeding.130 In acknowledging the possibility for claims trading at both
T0 and T2, courts can begin to envisage how pushing claims trading to occur at
these margins may limit the disruption stemming from the claims trading
process.131
B. The Benefits of Claims Trading at the Margins
Pushing claims to the margins can limit the level of disruption both debtors
and opposing creditors experience when a trade occurs, and thereby enhance the
likelihood of a successful bankruptcy.
1. Leveraging Claims Trading at T0
Leveraging claims trading at T0, especially in an effort to secure votes for
acceptance of a pre-petition plan, enhances the likelihood that the chapter 11
process will be short and smooth.132 Importantly, claims trading at T0 helps
reframe the situation as one involving committed partners in pursuit of joint
progress rather than one involving contentious opponents participating in a zerosum game.133 Furthermore, seeking out claims trading during the T0 timeframe
decreases the likelihood that the entire bankruptcy process will be delayed or
stalled by holdouts.134

128

Harner, supra note 69, at 73.
Id. at 72–73.
130
Id. at 73.
131
See Alexander, supra note 74, at 1454.
132
Courtney C. Carter, Saving Face in Southeast Asia: The Implementation of Prepackaged Plans of
Reorganization in Thailand, Malaysia, And Indonesia, 17 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 295, 297 (2000); John C
Coffee, Jr. et al., Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and
Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1250 (1991); see Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance
and Public Policy Implications Of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 n. 220 (2008)
(“‘Pre-packaging’ a chapter 11 reorganization enables a debtor to minimize the impact to its ongoing business
operations by combining many of the best aspects of out-of-court workouts - cost-efficiency, speed, flexibility
and cooperation - with the binding effect and structure of a conventional bankruptcy.”).
133
Id.
134
Id.
129
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a. A Short and Smooth Process
According to § 1121(a) of the Code, a “debtor may file a plan with a petition
commencing a voluntary case, or at any time in a voluntary case or an
involuntary case.”135 The Code thus grants the debtor the right to file a petition
and a plan for bankruptcy relief simultaneously.136 The bankruptcy courts often
acknowledge and may even confirm this “pre-packaged” plan, so long as, prior
to the petition for relief, the debtor has solicited and obtained the requisite
amount of acceptances from its creditors in support of the plan.137 The debtor
must also have disclosed adequate information to its creditors in soliciting such
support.138
During this pre-petition timeframe, soliciting votes in support of a plan is
critical.139 Unfortunately, creditors, foreseeing the looming struggles of
bankruptcy, often turn hostile during this pre-petition timeframe.140 This
hostility breeds delays and adds other unnecessary costs to the bankruptcy
proceeding, such as time-consuming litigation between the parties.141
Negotiations, especially when done during the pre-petition timeframe, may
forestall the above undesirable interactions and outcomes, as a debtor that
negotiates “with its major creditor constituencies” is better able to determine
whether “these groups will support its plan.”142
While negotiations are prevalent in many (if not all) bankruptcy cases postpetition, negotiations associated specifically with a pre-packaged plan offer
unique opportunities.143 Importantly, they help a potentially hostile creditor
fathom the inherent tensions and costs associated with a bankruptcy
proceeding.144 Armed with this information, many creditors then prefer to avoid

135

11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012).
See id. § 1121(a).
137
See id. § 1126.
138
Id. §§ 1126(b)(1)–(2).
139
See id. § 1126(c).
140
See Suniati Yap, Investing In Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures Or Whiteknights?, 2 SW. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 153, 158 (1995) (“[R]elations between the debtor and its creditors may not always be friendly by the time
a company is in need of reorganization.”).
141
11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (2012).
142
Carter, supra note 132, at 310.
143
See generally Yap, supra note 140.
144
See id. (“[B]y taking aggravated and sometimes hostile creditors out of the picture, the debtor can focus
on negotiations with parties who will listen to what makes financial sense.”).
136
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the bankruptcy process entirely with the sale of their pre-petition rights to a
distressed-debt investor.145
Claims trading as part of a prepacked plan thereby leads to a more
concentrated community of claims owners, predominantly a select few
distressed-debt investors.146 Since fewer investors mean fewer fights and a
greater degree of compromise in negotiations, the claims trading process thus
becomes “associated with . . . faster restructurings and more going-concern
sales.”147 Simply put, claims trading during the pre-petition timeframe both
smooths disruptions and promotes efficient outcomes in the bankruptcy case.
b. Partners in the Bankruptcy
The “symbiotic relationship between debtor and creditor” in chapter 11 cases
allows for the debtor to reorganize for the betterment of interested parties.148
With claims trading, the identities of claimholders constantly shift; they “are not
static.”149 A revolving door of creditors drains value from property of the estate,
frustrates negotiations between the debtor corporation and potential creditors,
and adds layers of confusion to the entire process.150 These resultant issues often
hinder the going-concern value of the debtor corporation and cause for chapter
11 recidivism (also known as “chapter 22” or “chapter 33”).151
The Code’s drafters initially contemplated bankruptcy filings involving only
two factions: the debtor and its “traditional creditors,”152 all of whom had a longstanding and ongoing relationship with each other.153 Yet the arrival of claims
trading allowed for a third party to enter into the bankruptcy dynamic: the
distressed-debt investor.154 While some distressed-debt investors truly intend to
integrate as if they belonged with the initial faction of creditors, the majority

145
David C. Smith, Claims Trading Promotes Ownership Concentration, 30-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 71
(April 2011).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Richard D. Thomas, Tipping The Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt Investors Decrease
Debtor Leverage and The Efficacy of Business Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 213, 222 (2010).
149
Id. at 221.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
A “traditional creditor” routinely came in the form of a single institutional lender. That lender often
already had a long-standing relationship with the debtor and backed the deserving debtor by supplying muchneeded capital for routine business operations.
153
Thomas, supra note 148, at 239.
154
Id. at 240.
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merely desire to extract value from its claims trade.155 As such, “the participation
of vulture funds [also termed distressed debt investors] cause[s] reorganization
to be more of a zero-sum game . . . [where t]he gain of a vulture fund engaging
in claim flipping is counterbalanced by the loss of some other party-ininterest.”156 That party-in-interest may be either a competing creditor or the
debtor corporation itself.157
A distressed-debt investor adds value by helping all parties involved in the
bankrupty efficiently navigate plan formation and confirmation; however, this
value only lasts only up until the moment that the distressed debt investor itself
exits the bankruptcy process by re-selling the claim to another claims
purchaser.158 Because liquidity is paramount to many distressed-debt investors
and hedge fund groups, these entities often seek a short-term interest in the
bankruptcy process and quick exit so as to remain liquid.159
Continuous negotiations between the debtor and new creditors take a toll on
all involved parties. Building relationships between the debtor and its creditors
takes time; however, in bankruptcy, time is a luxury that the debtor and its
creditor cannot afford to waste.160 Time amounts to money spent on professional
fees and plan negotiations.161 Participants in a chapter 11 reorganization intend
for the expense of building these relationships to go toward “preserving the
going-concern value of the business.”162 Yet every time that the debtor must
form a new relationship with a creditor due to claims trading, the debtor’s equity
as between its going-concern value and liquidation value is eroded.163
“The knowledge and familiarity that the selling creditor acquires in
negotiation is debtor-specific”; it is an “idiosyncratic investment—highly
specialized and not transferable.”164 When a creditor sells its claim to a
distressed-debt investor, that creditor exits the bankruptcy with its idiosyncratic
relationship with the debtor.165 A distressed investor, who is typically a stranger
155

Id.
Id.
157
See id. at 240–41 (“When the debtor suffers the losses resulting from vultures funds’ gains, the debtor’s
chances for success after emerging from bankruptcy are diminished along with the going-concern value of the
business.”).
158
Id. at 227–28.
159
Id. at 228.
160
Id. at 229.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 227, n. 117.
165
Id. at 227.
156
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to the debtor corporation, replaces the original creditor. As a result, the
distressed investor adds no relationship value to pending negotiations regarding
plan formulation and confirmation. Simply put, there is a “net loss in value
within the forum.”166
Repeated and continuous negotiations also cause the debtor corporation to
disengage from the reorganization process entirely:
[T]he [debtor-in-possession] has no incentive to negotiate with an
investor looking to flip its claim because the [debtor-in-possession]
has no confidence that the claimholders on day one will be the same
parties the [debtor-in-possession] speaks to on days three, five, twenty,
and so on; indeed “even the potential for trading deters parties from
investing in relationships and from cooperating.”167

As a result, the estate’s value wanes.168 Less and less becomes available for use
by the debtor toward a fresh start and alternatively for repayment to other
creditors post-plan confirmation.169
By pushing claims trading to the pre-petition timeframe of T0, creditors are
encouraged to acknowledge the imminent bankruptcy and to evaluate whether
they want to collaborate with the debtor as a long-term partner in the bankruptcy
process or exit the process via a transfer of claim. A limitation or restriction on
claims trading at T1 would “bar[] entry for [distressed-debt investors] that would
engage in claim-flipping while simultaneously allow[ing] a creditor that does
not wish to engage in negotiations to exit.”170 Therefore, courts should support
holding the identity of claimants relatively stagnant at T1 so as to beget
productive negotiations during that timeframe and preserve value for all
bankruptcy participants.171
In addition, the less time the debtor spends battling with creditors in the
bankruptcy process, the more likely the plan is to move forward and creditors
are to be repaid. Any “delay in productive negotiations has serious cost
consequences, such as causing the debtor to languish in bankruptcy longer than
necessary or increasing the probability of a sub-optimal plan being
confirmed.”172 Committed creditors, identified at T0, afford the debtor the

166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 236.
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opportunity to focus on restructuring efforts rather than waste time and money
on continuous rounds of negotiations with new claimants. As such, the amount
of time that a debtor remains in bankruptcy shrinks. Creditors are invested in the
debtor, and in return likely receive faster repayment terms, at a higher amount.
c. Holdouts
When a corporation can no longer service its debt obligations, it must face
the reality of either restructuring its debt under applicable non-bankruptcy law
provisions or restructuring its debt using the tools offered as part of the
bankruptcy process.173 The distressed corporation may either: (1) make a tender
offer to a creditor in the open market “at a price somewhat over the trading price,
but well below the face amount, of the outstanding debt securities”; or (2) “seek
approval of a ‘prepackaged’ plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy
Code.”174
In the instance where the debtor pursues a tender offer strategy, concerns
around creditor “holdout” arise.175 A tender offer under non-bankruptcy law
usually demands that ninety to ninety-five percent of the corporation’s
debtholders consent to and accept the proposed exchange offer.176 This high
percentage requirement means that any debtholder that owns greater than ten
percent of the debt is able to holdout from the agreement for debt restructuring,
harming both the distressed corporation and fellow debtholders.177 In effect,
holdouts “impede the ability of the majority of the bondholders to achieve a
consensual scaling down of the debtor corporation’s over-leveraged capital
structure that demands a pro rata sacrifice by each bondholder to avoid the
greater losses incident to bankruptcy.”178
In the alternative, the debtor may pursue a strategy at the T0 timeframe of
developing and soliciting votes in support of a pre-packaged plan.179 Although
all actions related to a pre-packaged plan occur before the filing of a petition for
relief (i.e., during when non-bankruptcy law typically governs), the plan bases

173

Coffee, supra note 132, at 1208.
Id. at 1209.
175
See id. at 1214 (“Both the corporate debtor and the other bondholders realize that if a significant
percentage of the debtholders spurn the proposed recapitalization then any savings realized by the corporation
will simply go on maturity to pay off the claims of these holdouts.”).
176
Id. at 1247–48.
177
See id. at 1216 (“The bondholder must fear both the issuer’s threats and its fellow bondholders’
opportunism.”).
178
Id. at 1214.
179
Id. at 1209
174
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its procedural operations off of applicable bankruptcy laws most commonly
utilized at time T1.180 As previously mentioned, the pre-packaged plan requires
the approval of each class of claims.181 The Code demands that “at least twothirds in amount and more than one-half in number” of claims approve the
proposed plan before the courts confirm that plan.182
Any attempt by the debtor to establish a pre-packaged plan signals to the
distressed corporation’s creditors that the corporation may soon file for
bankruptcy.183 Such a threat pressures “the bondholders into a kind of prisoner’s
dilemma, thereby coercing [them] to accept an amendment to their indenture
that in their unconstrained choice they would reject.”184 While the hostile
creditor may initially desire to holdout, the creditor’s individual bargaining
power becomes greatly diminished after a pre-packaged plan at the T0
timeframe is approved by a simple- and super-majority. Although the creditor
may still pursue a holdout strategy, the option to instead exit the imminent
bankruptcy with a claims trade becomes appealing. Thus, trading at T0 may
provide the debtor an opportunity to more readily achieve a favorable
recapitalization of its debt without the obstacle of a holdout.
In total, practicing claims trading at the T0 timeframe rather than the T1
timeframe offers a multitude of benefits to those entwined in the bankruptcy
process. It helps the debtors to establish a pre-packaged plan by removing
otherwise hostile creditors from the equation and replacing them with distresseddebt investors. Since these new entrants desire a return on their investment, they
are often more accommodating and committed to negotiating with the debtor on
best practices to restructure and reorganize as compared to the otherwise hostile
claimants. The debtor, in turn, is better equipped to develop and get approval for
a pre-packaged plan. Given that a pre-packaged plan developed during the T0
timeframe has the tendency to decrease the both the time and attendant costs of
bankruptcy, claims trading during the T0 timeframe can be said to promote
efficient outcomes and reduce the amount of disruption to the overall process.

180
181
182
183
184

See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012).
Id. §§ 1126(c)–(d).
Id.
See generally Coffee, supra note 132, at 1207.
Id. at 1212.

FOLKERTH_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

CLAIMS TRADINGS AT THE MARGINS

6/14/2018 3:48 PM

747

2. Applying Claims Trading at T2
Limiting claims trading to the T2 timeframe can also be instrumental to plan
confirmation.185 The benefits of such a restriction are heightened in instances
where a claims trade has the potential either to damage the debtor corporation’s
market value or to harm a proposed plan’s third-party beneficiaries.186
Damage to a debtor corporation’s market value generally means that the
debtor has less funds available for compensation or is in a weakened state to then
payout on various claims against the estate. Any damage done to a debtor’s
market value hence harms not only the debtor in its own ability to be
rehabilitated through the bankruptcy process, but also the collective body of
creditors that rely on a potential payout on their claims. Equally so, damage to a
debtor’s market value harms those other beneficiaries that the debtor owes due
to tort-related action.
Courts have historically placed injunctions on claims trading during the T1
timeframe to forestall harm to the debtor, especially where such harm stems
from the associated tax consequences that arise from a claims trade.187 Courts
have also enjoined a distressed-debt investor from trading on a claim when the
creation of a trust was deemed necessary to resolve asbestos or other products
liability claims as part in the bankruptcy case. 188 A delay in claims trading, until
the T2 timeframe, thus allows bankruptcy participants to more thoughtfully
analyze the impact that a trade may have on each party’s rights, obligations, and
overall success of reorganization.189
a. Injunction for the Protection of Third-Parties
While claims trading most routinely affects the rights of those traditionally
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding (i.e., debtors and common creditors, such
185
See In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. 136, 169 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (where “approval and
entry of the claims trading injunction . . . was essential to the formulation and implementation of the plan as
provided in 11 U.S.C.S. § 1123(a)(5).”).
186
See Jean Morris, Imposition of Transfer Limitations on Claims and Equity Interests During Corporate
Debtor’s Chapter 11 Case to Preserve the Debtor’s Net Operating Loss Carryforward: Examining the Emerging
Trend, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 285, 287 (2003) (where “restrictions on the ability of the debtor to carry forward
existing NOLs to future profitable years . . . motivated debtors to attempt to obtain orders from the bankruptcy
court restraining trading . . . that could, even unintentionally, adversely affect this potential value.”); see In re
Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991); see Erik Stegemiller, Winning Losses: Trading Injunctions
and the Treatment of Net Operating Loss Carryovers in Chapter 11, 32 YALE J. REG. 161, 173 (2015).
187
See generally Morris, supra note 186, at 289; In re Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 573; Stegemiller,
supra note 186, at 176.
188
See generally In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 160.
189
See generally Stegemiller, supra note 186, at 196.
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as lenders, suppliers, etc.), in some circumstances the proposed plan may impact
third-parties as well.190 In In re Armstrong, the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Delaware strictly enforced its powers to govern a specific group of claims that
distressed-debt investors sought to purchase as simple securities in the
bankruptcy market.191
Before its filing, Armstrong World Industry, Inc. (“AWI”) had suits pending
against it for asbestos-related personal injury and property damage.192 In filing
a petition for relief, AWI showcased in its disclosure statement that it had paid
over $500 million in settlement payments for asbestos-related personal injury
claims and wrongful death charges.193 Further, “[a]s of September 30, 2000,
approximately 173,000 asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death
claims were pending against AWI within the tort system in a multitude of
jurisdictions.”194 AWI thus met with creditors to establish a plan for repayment
of allowed claims belonging to those creditors harmed by its asbestos-containing
products.195
The confirmed chapter 11 plan specified that a special trust would be created,
and that all asbestos-related personal injury claims would be channeled into that
trust.196 To effectuate this plan, the court relied on the equitable powers granted
to it under § 524(g) and § 105(a) of the Code to issue an injunction that would
“permanently and forever stay, restrain, and enjoin any Entity from, directly or
indirectly, purchasing, selling, transferring, assigning, conveying, pledging, or
otherwise acquiring or disposing of any Asbestos Personal Injury Claim.”197
Any attempt to act on such an enjoined trade was deemed immediately void.198
In effect, the injunction assisted in the creation of the “Asbestos Channeling
Trust” so that the exact amount of legal liability could be determined and so that
the debtor could continue to operate post-bankruptcy with ease (i.e., without the
administrative burden of tracking and managing the payout on claims to the
more than 170,000 claimants).199 It further kept distressed-debt investors from
190

See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 186.
See generally id. at 157.
192
Id. at 141.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 142.
196
Id. at 152.
197
Id. at 156; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 524(g)(1).
198
In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 156.
199
See id. at 152 (“With respect to any Asbestos Personal Injury Claim that is allowed by the Asbestos PI
Trust in accordance with the Asbestos PI Trust Agreement and the Asbestos PI Trust Distribution Procedures,
such allowance shall establish the amount of legal liability against the Asbestos PI Trust in the amount of the
191
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trading on these channeled claims, which would have irreparably harmed the
bankruptcy process due to the sheer volume of channeled claims that could be
traded on within the T1 timeframe. The injunction issued during the T1
timeframe thus not only helped the debtor achieve a “fresh start,” but further
protected creditors with unliquidated and contingent claims.
Although the injunction discussed in In re Armstrong indefinitely restrained
all claims trading activity, not all such forms of equitable relief need be equally
permanent. The relief should “be tailored as much as possible to the complexion
of the particular case, with an eye to preserving benefits that might be realized
from claims trading to the extent not incompatible with the rehabilitative goals
of [c]hapter 11.”200 Consequently, courts should likewise contemplate
temporary injunctions related to claims trading that produce similar outcomes to
that of permanent injunctions: helping the debtor achieve a “fresh start” while
simultaneously protecting creditors with unliquidated and contingent claims.
The benefits of diverting claims trading away from the T1 timeframe and
toward the T2 timeframe therefore can, and likely does, produce desirable results
within the bankruptcy process. With a temporary injunction, a debtor
corporation is able to focus on producing a quality plan and continue running its
business as a debtor-in-possession, until plan confirmation. Importantly, thirdparty beneficiaries also benefit from the injunction. A delayed bankruptcy
proceeding due to the continuous shifting of claim ownership and litigation over
those claims within bankruptcy may forestall payout or even drive the debtor to
liquidate rather than reorganize under chapter 11. If the debtor were to liquidate,
the creditors would receive less in repayment. Incentivizing the debtor to remain
and successfully utilize the chapter 11 process, which may include the assistance
of a temporary injunction on claims trading at T1, maximizes value for all
participants.
b. Injunction for the Maintenance of a Debtor’s Fair Market Value
Besides a petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Code, a debtor
corporation frequently will file a simultaneous series of first day motions.201
These motions are “designed to obtain orders of the bankruptcy court that will
preserve the value of the debtor’s operations as it enters the reorganization
process, allow normal operations to continue, and provide financing for the
liquidated value of such Claim, as determined in accordance with the Asbestos PI Trust Distribution
Procedures.”).
200
Tung, supra note 29, at 1750.
201
Morris, supra note 186, at 285.
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debtor’s business.”202 Typical first-day motions include: permission for the
debtor to continue making payroll allowances to its employees; allowance for
alternative financing mechanisms; approval of methods or options for notifying
creditors and other interested parties; preservation of the cash management
systems; and the continuance of core business functions.203
In recent years, debtor corporations have also moved for a restraint on
“trading in the debtor’s equity and debt securities by large holders of such
instruments.”204 The basis for this injunctive relief stems from the debtor
corporation’s claim that “the transfer of such securities might impair the debtor’s
right to utilize a net operating loss (‘NOL’).”205 NOLs arise when a taxpayer’s
allowed deductible expenses for a given tax year are greater than the taxpayer’s
net income generated during that same tax year.206 When the taxpayer incurs
more expenses than income, the taxpayer may either apply its NOLs to the prior
three years (“carry-back”) or to the future fifteen years (“carry-forward”).207 If
the taxpayer elects to utilize its carry-back NOLs, the taxpayer is entitled to a
tax refund; if the taxpayer elects to utilize its carry-forward NOLs, it is entitled
to a speculative offset on potential future earnings. Either way, these NOLs
accrue to the benefit of the taxpayer by reducing the overall tax burden incurred
over the life of the corporation’s existence.
Although the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) defines how NOLs arise and are
preserved by a corporation, the IRC also notes how NOLs may be lost or
restricted under certain circumstances.208 Two such circumstances include when
the debtor corporation changes ownership via the transfer of stock or
alternatively via the conversion of debt to equity.209 As routinely happens in
bankruptcy, claims trading affords a distressed-debt investor the ability to
demand a debt for equity conversion on a recently-acquired claim. However, the
“fear of lost value, through restrictions on the ability of the debtor to carry
forward existing NOLs to future profitable years, has motivated debtors to
attempt to obtain orders from the bankruptcy court restraining trading in debt
and equity interests that could, even unintentionally, adversely affect this
potential value.”210
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
See id. (listing the various first-day motions available to a debtor company).
Id.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 172(c) (2012).
Id. § 172(b)(1)(B).
See id. §§ 269, 381, 383, 384.
Morris, supra note 186, at 286; see 26 U.S.C. § 382(g) (2012).
Morris, supra note 186.
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Most courts have agreed to comply with a debtor’s injunctive requests
against claims trading on the basis that NOLs fold into the bankruptcy process
by being deemed property of the estate.211 The Code defines property of the
estate to encompass “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case.”212 Bankruptcy courts have elaborated on this
subject, indicating that “virtually all property of debtor . . . becomes property of
estate; debtor’s contingent interest in future income . . . . [I]n fact, every
conceivable interest of debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative,
and derivative, is within reach . . . .”213 These findings support the conclusion
that NOLs, whether contingent, unliquidated, or speculative, indeed fall under
property of the estate in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Importantly, a creditor may not exercise any form of control over property
of the estate, including NOLs, per the automatic stay limitations found in the
Code.214 In instances where an NOL may be harmed or limited by claims trading,
the claims trading may be construed as a creditor’s attempt to exercise control
over property of the estate.215 Per § 362 of the Code, the creditor is automatically
stayed from such action.216 Therefore, courts have reasoned that an injunction
on claims trading is appropriate.217
In re Prudential Lines stands as the leading authority on the court’s issuance
of an injunction for the reasons specified above.218 In In re Prudential Lines, the
appellant, debtor corporation’s parent company PSS Steamship Company, Inc.,
(“PSS”) sought review of an order restricting claims trading on the debtor’s debt
and equity interests.219 Since 1976, the debtor Prudential Lines, Inc. (“PLI”) and
its parent (along with two other affiliates) filed consolidated income tax returns
as allowed by the IRC under 26 U.S.C. § 1501.220 Collectively, the group had a
combined amount of $75 million worth of NOLs generated in 1988 to offset
either prior or future income.221 PLI’s pre-bankruptcy operations contributed to
nearly $74 million of that total amount.222 The initial proposed plan for

211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 293.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 541.
Id. § 362(a)(3).
See e.g., In re Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991).
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
See e.g., In re Prudential Lines, 928 F.2d at 573.
See generally id.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567–69.
Id. at 567.
Id.
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reorganization contemplated that these NOLs would be retained by PLI and
consequently would be available to offset the reorganized debtor’s income in
future years.223
In February 1989, tax counsel informed PSS that it could take a $38.9 million
income deduction on its 1988 federal tax return.224 The stock deduction stemmed
from the company’s “worthless stock” holdings in the subsidiary, PLI.225 Taking
the deduction, though, would cause a chain reaction, leaving PLI bereft and
without its potential carryforward NOL.226 Even so, in November, PSS decided
to pursue taking the deduction.227 The appellees, the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors and others, in response sought to enjoin PSS and thereby
shelter Prudential’s NOLs.228 “The bankruptcy court held that the NOL
generated by PLI was property of PLI’s bankruptcy estate and that the worthless
stock deduction was an attempt to exercise control over that property in violation
of the automatic stay” under § 362(a)(3) of the Code.229 The court issued a
permanent injunction prohibiting PSS from taking the worthless stock deduction
as part of its federal tax return because of the associated harm to the debtor’s
value post-bankruptcy.230
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding.231 In
short, the filing of a consolidated tax return does not give rise to the transfer of
any asset from the affiliate or subsidiary to its parent company.232 As such, the
Second Circuit held that “at the commencement of the bankruptcy case against
it, PLI had an interest in the $74 million NOL attributable to its pre-bankruptcy
operation.”233
Previous courts have been known to support carryback NOLs as property of
the estate; however, until In re Prudential, courts remained silent on the status
of carryforward NOLs.234 The Second Circuit went on to hold that “the
speculative nature of carryforwards does not place them outside the definition
223

Id.
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 567–68.
228
Id. at 568.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 566–71.
232
Id. (“The fact that a subsidiary’s NOL ultimately may be used to offset another corporation’s income
does not mean that the subsidiary loses any interest in its NOL.”).
233
Id. at 571.
234
Id.
224
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of property of the estate. “The term ‘property’ has been construed most
generously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or
contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.”235 Congress also
contemplated that unused tax benefits, such NOLs (for individual debtors), are
to be transferred back to the debtor from the estate upon closure of a case.236
While § 346(i) of the Code does not expressly encompass corporate debtors,
“Congress’ failure to include corporate debtors in that provision does not imply
. . . that Congress meant to treat NOL carryforwards of corporate debtors
differently than those of individual debtors.”237 Consequently, the $74 million
NOL fully belonged to PLI’s estate in bankruptcy.238
As a result, the Second Circuit enjoined PSS from taking the stock
deduction.239 Because the PSS’s stock deduction was so heavily intertwined with
PLI’s interest in its NOL, any attempt by PSS to exercise that worthless stock
deduction would adversely harm PLI’s ability to use its carryforward NOL.240
Therefore, such an attempt was impermissible.241
Recent court opinions have questioned the validity of this type of injunctive
motion made by the debtor.242 Courts often cite how these injunctions arguably
limit the liquidity of claims in the bankruptcy market.243 Consequently, a
creditor seeking to exit the bankruptcy has no choice but to enter the bankruptcy
proceeding with the debtor, regardless of what the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure discuss on the transfer of a claim.244
Nonetheless, the use of an injunction to preserve the value of a debtor
corporation is a recognizable right that may help push claims trading away from
T1. In looking to shift claims trading to T0 or T2, the courts may encourage
bankruptcy participants to deeply analyze whether the trade makes economic
sense—both for the distressed corporation and its creditors. Instead of focusing
on an individual creditor’s opportunities to the exclusion of other creditors, the
injunction helps bolster the likelihood that a creditor acts for the betterment of
the collective group of creditors. Moreover, the injunction increases the

235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Id. at 572.
11 U.S.C. § 346(i)(2) (2012).
Id. at 572–73.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 574.
Morris, supra note 186, at 286.
Id.
Id.
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likelihood that the debtor corporation receives a fresh start post-bankruptcy, as
additional value is saved for operating the company post-reorganization or postrepayment.
Because claims trading defeats the debtor’s ability to fully utilize these tax
benefits post-bankruptcy, courts should issue injunctions on trading at T1 and
push such trading to either T0 or T2 when a change of ownership and its resultant
impact on the value of the corporation can be more comprehensively evaluated.
At T0, creditors are more likely to pursue strategies that maintain as much value
as possible for restructuring purposes—especially given that restructuring offers
greater returns than mere chapter 7 liquidation. At T2, creditors are better able
to forecast the likely success of the debtor’s ability to comply with its confirmed
plan, and thus whether the debtor can afford to lose its potential tax offsets in
favor of other beneficial financing or alternative ownership structures. Limiting
trading at T1 creates stability and allows for maximum value to be preserved in
favor of the debtor corporation and distributed to deserving creditors.
C. How to Encourage Claims Trading at the Margins
While the primary focus of this Comment remains on the simple
acknowledgement that claims trading at T0 and T2 minimizes disruption, a few
strategies for achieving these ends are worth mentioning. Accordingly,
participants in the chapter 11 process can deter distressed-debt investors from
trading, or disincentivize such trading from taking place between the filing date
and plan confirmation, by requiring compliance with procedural formalities
under Rule 3001(e)(2) or challenging a trade’s occurrence under
§§ 1126(e), 524(g), and 105(a) of the Code.
1. Rule 3001(e)(2)
Rule 3001(e)(2) of FRBP should be rolled back to its pre-1991 amendment
version so as to grant courts, once again, the sua sponte power to dampen the
disruptive effects that claims trading has on an already-volatile time period. The
Rule, amended in 1991, discusses the procedural requirements for the transfer
of a claim. In accordance with this provision, a transferee must file evidence of
the transfer with the court after said transfer has taken place.245 Upon filing by
the transferee, the court will notify the transferor of the transfer.246 So long as
the claim is not “one based on a publicly traded note, bond, or debenture” and it

245
246

FED. R. BANKR. P 3001(e)(2).
Id.
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“has been transferred other than for security,” the court will substitute the
transferee for the transferor with regard to ownership of the claim.247
Under the current Rule, only the transferor of a claim may object to a claims
trade made to an alleged transferee.248 If the transferor elects to “file[] a timely
objection and the court finds, after notice and a hearing, that the claim has been
transferred other than for security, it shall enter an order substituting the
transferee for the transferor.” 249
While the amended Rule limits the range of parties (i.e., those with the
requisite standing to act) to the transferor and transferee, courts were previously
allowed to “condition trading in response to particular perceived abuses” sua
sponte.250 For instance, in In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. and In re Allegheny
Int’l, Inc., the courts intervened and reversed the claims trades because of
informational asymmetries.251 The concern here in each case was that the
transferee was taking advantage of the transferor because the traded claim failed
to meet minimum disclosure “requirements.”252 The court thus demanded
“taking of remedial measures to provide full disclosure to assignors.”253
Another bankruptcy court pursued similar remedial measures in In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., where a transferee sought to split a claim.254 There, the
parties agreed to split a claim and transfer only a partial interest rather than a full
interest in the claim.255 Because such a partial claims trade “would increase
administrative burdens on the estate,” the court refused to approve the transfer
unless the transferor and transferee agreed to specific remedial measures. 256
The Federal Rules should thus be amended such that Rule 3001(e)(2) grants
standing to courts to bring an action or object to a claims trade. By demanding
the claims seller and purchaser comply with the procedural requirements under

247
Id.; see Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 206 (“The amended language of Rule 3001(e)(2) vastly reduced
court interference with the transfer of bankruptcy claims by making it clear that only the transferor has standing
to object to a transfer, and by eliminating the need for a court hearing and court order to effect a transfer.”).
248
Tung, supra note 29, at 1703.
249
FED. R. BANKR. P 3001(e)(2).
250
Tung, supra note 29, at 1704.
251
Id. at 1703 n. 96; see generally In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985);
In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
252
Tung, supra note 29, at 1703 n. 96.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.; see generally In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 119 B.R. 440, 441 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
256
Tung, supra note 29, at 1703 n. 96.
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the Rule, the courts can inhibit rampant and unfettered trading.257 In doing so,
the courts can help force claims trading to occur outside of the T1 timeframe,
where traders are less likely to trade on asymmetrical information or attempt to
purchase derivative-like interests in claims. Traders at these margins are not
incentivized to overzealously take advantage of one another or construct
inappropriate methods for purchasing a claim but instead are encouraged to
pursue strategies that enhance the likelihood of a successful exit from
bankruptcy. Therefore, the Federal Rules should be amended to allow the courts
more discretion in pushing claims trading to occur at T0 and T2 in the transfer
of a claim between a transferor and transferee.
2. Section 1126(e)
Courts can induce claims trading at the margins rather than during pivotal
moments in the bankruptcy case by use of § 1126(e). Section 1126(e) permits a
party in interest to petition the court to “designate” or disqualify a vote that
would otherwise impact a plan’s formation.258 Courts typically designate votes
for a lack of “good faith.”259 Although the Code does not define “good faith” as
part of its definitions section in chapter 1, various courts have made suggestions
to its meaning.260 For instance, one court designated a vote because the creditor
sought to block plan confirmation to garner leverage in support of its own
restructuring plan, whereby it would ultimately acquire control over the debtor
corporation post-bankruptcy.261 Another court designated a creditor’s vote for
the creditor’s desire to inhibit the business’s potential to succeed in the future.262
Over time, the courts have developed key factors that help distinguish an action
of good faith versus an action of bad faith.263 While none of these factors are
controlling, both time of acquisition and price paid by the transferor are
considered most relevant.264
The Securities and Exchange Commission reframed these two factors and
brought them under a broader standard test based around a creditor’s motive in

257
See Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 206 (noting how the amendment “paved the way for the growth of
distressed debt funds by lowering both the transaction costs of claims trading and diminishing the uncertainty
over the legitimacy of claims acquired after bankruptcy filing.”).
258
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012).
259
Tung, supra note 29, at 1704.
260
Id. at 1703–04.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Andrew Africk, Comment, Trading Claims in Chapter 11: How Much Influence Can Be Purchased in
Good Faith Under Section 1126?, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1393, 1404 (1991).
264
Id.
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the bankruptcy process: “if assent is withheld to serve some ulterior selfish
purpose, good faith is wanting.”265 While creditors are obviously understood to
act in their own best self-interest, “pure malice, ‘strikes’ and blackmail, and the
purpose to destroy an enterprise to advance the interests of a competing business,
all plainly constituting bad faith [sic], are motives which may be accurately
described as ulterior.”266
Hedge funds and other distressed-debt investors seek to quickly purchase a
claim at a steep discount for the express purpose of aggressively participating as
a new creditor in the bankruptcy process. As an active investor, the creditor may
pursue complex strategies that may or may not be aligned with the Code’s twin
purposes of offering the debtor a fresh start and distributing claims pro rata to
similarly situated creditors. In frustrating the Code’s purposes, these vulture
investors often act in bad faith.
The most pivotal time to affect a bankruptcy case is at T1, right before plan
confirmation.267 Courts thus must aggressively use § 1126(e) to push claims
trading to T0 or T2, where the incentives for blocking or shifting a
reorganization or restructuring plan are lessened because the plan has been
approved as part of a pre-packaged deal or because the plan has already been
confirmed and may only be modified thereafter. Courts thereby limit the degree
of disruption to the bankruptcy process while at the same time respecting the
need for liquidity in the bankruptcy market.
3. Section 524(g)
Courts routinely justify the use of this injunctive relief on the grounds that
such an injunction is “essential to the formulation and implementation of the
Plan as provided in section 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”268 With the
frequency of claims trading on the rise and its concurrent disruptive impact on
the bankruptcy process, courts should begin employing § 524(g) of the Code to
push trading to the margins and away from processes essential to the formulation
and implementation of the plan.
Section 524(g) indicates that “after notice and hearing, a court that enters an
order confirming a plan of reorganization under chapter 11 may issue, in

265
266
267
268

Id. at 1405.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).
In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. 136, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
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connection with such order, an injunction.”269 The purpose of the injunction is
to enjoin “entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or
indirectly collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect
to any claim . . . [that] is to be paid in whole or in part by a trust . . . .”270 As an
essential component to the formulation and implementation of a chapter 11 plan,
the injunction bestows upon both the debtor corporation and its creditors
measureable benefits.271 These benefits include preservation of value for the
debtor, ease of channeling the creditors’ interests into the trust, and fulfillment
of the terms of the plan to allow for discharge.272
By acknowledging prior precedent entailing the issuance of an injunction,
courts may begin to embrace or become more comfortable issuing injunctions
in other broader settings and scenarios in which claims trading is involved. As
previously mentioned, courts have issued injunctions on claims trading to
preserve either the debtor’s market value or the debtor’s ability to protect thirdparties from predatory investors. In examining the facts surrounding these two
cases, it becomes evident that any case involving a large body of creditors that
hold either unliquidated or contingent claims, or any case in which the debtor’s
fair market value may be diminished by a claims trade, would constitute the use
of an injunction during T1 to quiet the trading on claims and thereby limit
disruption to the overall bankruptcy process.
Section 105(a) importantly mirrors this proposition, indicating that an
injunction for these purposes is appropriate to carry out the twin-aims of the
Code.
4. Section 105(a)
Courts should rely on § 105 of the Code to issue an injunction or other
equitable relief for the purpose of diverting the majority of claims trading
activities to the margins.273 Section 105(a) permit a court to “issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title.”274 The courts may enforce these orders, processes, and judgments
sua sponte.275 However, § 105 “does not authorize [] bankruptcy courts to create
269

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1) (2012).
Id.
271
In re Armstrong World Indus., 348 B.R. at 169.
272
See id. (“such injunction . . . confers material benefits on AWI’s estate [and] is in the best interests of
holders of Claims against AWI.”).
273
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
274
Id. § 105(a).
275
See id.
270
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substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or
constitute a roving commission to do equity.”276
Section 105 often gets cited by the courts when there is a need for the
issuance of an injunction or related equitable remedy.277 Especially with regard
to claims trading, “[c]ourts have explicitly relied on Section 105(a) . . .
responding to the threat of imposition of externalities on the estate.”278 Courts
often note their concerns regarding the administrative demands placed on the
estate and the debtor when claims are traded over and over again.279 The estate
and the debtor must expend time and money to monitor, administer, and object
to the sale and purchase of a claim—all of which constitute a drain on the limited
resources of the estate and debtor, which may otherwise be spent on paying back
creditors.
Section 105 therefore authorizes the bankruptcy courts to “fashion
appropriate remedies to protect against threatened harm to or interference with
the sound administration of the estate.”280 Claims traders can be stopped from
trading whenever the court elects to find the claims trading process a burden on
the estate and the debtor, or a detriment to the restructuring process as a whole.
An injunction on claims trading at T1 would no doubt diminish the burden on
the debtor in its efforts to present a comprehensive reorganization plan.
Conversely, at T0 the debtor operates as a proactive party persuading its
creditors to vote in favor of a proposed pre-packaged plan. At the opposite
extreme of T2, the debtor is merely executing on the performance of its postconfirmation obligations under the plan. The potential for disruption from claims
trading at T1 is heightened as compared to T0 and T2.
As such, the courts should use § 105 of the Code to issue an injunction or
other equitable relief so as to shove the majority of claims trading activities to
the margins.
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CONCLUSION
The timing of a claims trade drastically influences the inquiry into the
perceived benefits and harms associated with that trade’s occurrence. As such,
claims trading may be less disruptive to the bankruptcy process than
commentators have previously assumed. The practice may in fact further the
purposes of bankruptcy when executed during the pre-petition and post-plan
confirmation timeframes. Thus, legal reform that promotes claims trading prior
to a petition for relief and after plan confirmation carries benefits for the debtor,
other creditors, and even the distressed-debt investor.
Specifically, courts should implement strategies within the Code and an
amended Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that drive claims trading to the
outer bands of the bankruptcy timeline at T0 or T2. Drafters of the Code may
have intended for claims trading to lend itself in support of bankruptcy’s twin
aims, yet it failed to anticipate the degree by which trading perhaps now
overrides these objectives. As one commentator aptly states:
This unbalanced situation is not necessarily the fault of the distressed
debt investor. The investor has no duty to act on behalf of the debtor’s
other creditors or shareholders, but does have a duty to act in the best
interests of its own partners. The challenge then is to create a more
balanced playing field in bankruptcy to provide an effective check on
investors’ activities and a meaningful fiduciary to protect the interests
of the debtor’s estate.281

Identifying the disruption caused by claims trading at T1 and encouraging
trading at the margins will restore equilibrium and reinforce the Code’s
objectives.
No doubt fewer distressed-debt investors will participate in the purchasing
of claims because any such “restriction on resale [will] contract[] the size of the
market.”282 However, bankruptcy is first and foremost about offering the debtor
a fresh start and maximizing value for creditors. To safeguard these ends,
bankruptcy participants should consider restrictions on claims trading at T1 and
contemplate legal reforms that encourage claims trading at T0 and T2.
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